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Full text of "Acheson Speech on the Far East - 12 January 1950"

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Speech on the Far East 


Dean Acheson 
January 12, 1950 

...I am frequently asked: Has the State Department go an Asian policy? And it seems to me 
that that discloses such a depth of ignorance that it is very hard to begin to deal with it. The 
peoples of Asia are so incredibly diverse and their problems are so incredibly diverse that 
how could anyone, even the most utter charlatan, believe that he had a uniform policy 
which would deal with all of them. On the other hand, there are very important similarities 
in ideas and in problems among the peoples of Asia and so what we come to, after we 
understand these diversities and these common attitudes of mind, is the fact that there 
must be certain similarities of approach, and there must be very great dissimilarities in 
action.... 

There is in this vast area what we might call a developing Asian consciousness, and a 
developing pattern, and this, I think, is based upon two factors.... 

One of these factors is a revulsion against the acceptance of misery and poverty as the 
normal condition of life. Throughout all of this vast area, you have that fundamental 
revolutionary aspect in mind and belief. The other common aspect that they have is the 
revulsion against foreign domination. Whether that foreign domination takes the form of 
colonialism or whether it takes the form of imperialism, they are through with it. They have 
had enough of it, and they want no more.... 

Now, may I suggest to you that much of the bewilderment which has seized the minds of 
many of us about recent developments in China comes from a failure to understand this 
basic revolutionary force which is loose in Asia. The reasons for the fall of the Nationalist 
Government in china are preoccupying many people. All sorts of reasons have been 
attributed to it. Most commonly, it is said in various speeches and publications that it is the 
result of American bungling, that we are incompetent, that we did not understand, that 
American aid was too little, that we did the wrong things at the wrong time. ...Now, what I 
ask you to do is to stop looking for a moment under the bed and under the chair and under 
the rug to find out these reasons, but rather to look at the broad picture and see whether 
something doesn't suggest itself.... 

What has happened in my judgment is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese 
people in their misery ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was 
really nothing to overthrow. They simply ignored it. ..They completely withdrew their support 
from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military 
establishment disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence every experienced by any 
military command was this total lack of support both in the armies and in the country, and 
so the whole matter just simply disintegrated. 

The communists did not create this. The Communists did not create this condition. They did 
not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create a great force which moved out from 
under Chiang Kai-shek. But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing 
into victory and into power... 

Now, let me come to another underlying and important factor which determines our 
relations and, in turn, our policy with the peoples of Asia. That is the attitude of the Soviet 



Union toward Asia, and particularly towards those parts of Asia which are contiguous to the 
Soviet Union, and with great particularity this afternoon, to north China. 

The attitude and interest of the Russians in north China, and in these other areas as well, 
long antedates communism. This is not something that has come out of communism at all. 

It long antedates it. But the Communist regime has added new methods, new skills, and 
new concepts to the thrust of Russian imperialism. This Communistic concept and 
techniques have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of 
penetration. Armed with these new powers, what is happening in China is that the Soviet 
Union is detaching the northern provinces [areas] of China from China and is attaching 
them to the Soviet Union. This process is complete in outer Mongolia. It is nearly complete 
in Manchuria, and I am sure that in inner Mongolia and in Sinkiang there are very happy 
reports coming from Soviet agents to Moscow. This is what is going on. It is the detachment 
of these whole areas, vast areas— populated by Chinese— the detachment of these areas 
from China and their attachment to the Soviet Union. 

I wish to state this and perhaps sin against my doctrine of non-dogmatism, but I should like 
to suggest at any rate that this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern 
provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any 
foreign power with Asia. 

What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that 
nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this 
fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can 
obscure it is the folly of ill— conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so, and I 
urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not 
seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must 
not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, 
and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to 
ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken— that anyone who violates the 
integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I 
suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the great rule in regard to the formulation of 
American policy toward Asia. 

I suggest that the second rule is very like the first. That is to keep our own purposes 
perfectly straight, perfectly pure, and perfectly aboveboard and do not get them mixed— up 
with legal quibbles or the attempt to do one thing and really achieve another.... 

What is the situation in regard to the military security of the Pacific area, and what is our 
policy in regard to it? 

In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan has placed upon the United 
States the necessity of assuming the military defense of Japan so long as that is required, 
both in the interest of our security and in the interests of the security of the entire Pacific 
area and, in all honor, in the interest of Japanese security. We have American— and there 
are Australia— troops in Japan. I am not in a position to speak for the Australians, but I can 
assure you that there is not intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the defenses 
of Japan and that whatever arrangements are to be made either through permanent 
settlement or otherwise, that defense must and shall be maintained. 


The defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. 
We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to 



hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time 
offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential 
parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held. 

The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands. Our relations, our 
defensive relations with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us. Those 
agreements are being loyally carried out and will be loyally carried out. Both peoples have 
learned by bitter experience the vital connections between our mutual defense 
requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is hardly necessary for me to say an 
attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But I 
hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any such attack. 

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that 
no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that 
such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship. 

Should such an attack occur— one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come 
from— the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the 
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations which so 
far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect 
their independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake, I think, in considering 
Pacific and Far Eastern problems to become obsessed with military considerations. 

Important as they are, there are other problems that press, and these other problems are 
not capable of solution through military means. These other problems arise out of the 
susceptibility of many areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion and 
penetration. That cannot be stopped military means. 

The susceptibility to penetration arises because in many areas there are new governments 
which have little experience in governmental administration and have not become firmly 
established or perhaps firmly accepted in their countries. They grow, in part, from very 
serious economic problems. ...In part this susceptibility to penetration comes from the great 
social upheaval about which I have been speaking.... 

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has 
dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own, and know it, and 
intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between east and 
west are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitations, and which at their best 
were paternalism. That relationship is over, and the relationship of east and west must now 
be in the Far East one of mutual respect and mutual helpfulness. We are their friends. 

Others are their friends. We and those others are willing to help, but we can help only 
where we are wanted and only where the conditions of help are really sensible and possible. 
So what we can see is that this new day in Asia, this new day which is dawning, may go on 
to a glorious noon or it may darken and it may drizzle out. But that decision lies within the 
countries of Asia and within the power of the Asian people. It is not a decision which a 
friend or even an enemy from the outside can decide for them.